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Abstract
This Essay first reviews the controversy surrounding the issuance of procedures for amicus
curiae submissions by the Appellate Body in E.C.—Asbestos. Second, it looks at the history and
practice of amicus curiae briefs at the WTO. Third, the Essay looks at how in the United States an
amicus curiae has changed from being a “friend of the court” to a “judicial lobbyist,” and specif-
ically, focusing on the procedural approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in addressing the
negative impact of such judicial lobbying. Finally, the Essay draws certain lessons from the U.S.
experience and concludes that the Appellate Body in E.C.—Asbestos adopted the U.S. Supreme
Court approach in dealing with the “problem” of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.
JUDICIAL LOBBYING AT THE WTO:
THE DEBATE OVER THE USE OF
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS AND
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
Padideh Ala'i*
INTRODUCTION
The continuing debate over the use of amicus curiae briefs
at the World Trade Organization' ("WTO") raises interesting
questions about the influence of the U.S. legal system on the
WTO dispute settlement process. Specifically, it brings to the
surface differences between legal cultures and the fact that the
U.S. legal culture with its emphasis on procedure is not readily
transferable to the WTO. Comparing the controversy regarding
the use of amicus curiae briefs before WTO Panels and the Ap-
pellate Body with the history and evolution of the institution of
amicus curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court may help explain
the solitary support of the United States for the Appellate Body's
decision to issue additional procedures for the filing of amicus
curiae briefs in European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos containing Products ("E. C.-Asbestos") .2 This Essay
first reviews the controversy surrounding the issuance of proce-
dures for amicus curiae submissions by the Appellate Body in
E.C.-Asbestos. Second, it looks at the history and practice of
amicus curiae briefs at the WTO.3 Third, the Essay looks at how
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Harvard Law School, J.D. 1988. I would like to thank my research assistants Karen
Ernst, Ada Loo, Derek Wenzel, and Jeremy Zuba. I remain forever thankful to my
mother, Guity Ala'i, without whose presence and help I could not have written this
Essay.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
2. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter E.C.-Asbestos Panel
Report].
3. It also must be mentioned that other inter-governmental institutions allow for
amicus curiae briefs including, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, European Court of Human
Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and International Court ofJustice. See
generally Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Interna-
tional Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (arguing that national and re-
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in the United States an amicus curiae has changed from being a
"friend of the court" to a 'judicial lobbyist," and specifically, fo-
cusing on the procedural approach taken by the U.S. Supreme
Court in addressing the negative impact of such judicial lobby-
ing. Finally, the Essay draws certain lessons from the U.S. experi-
ence and concludes that the Appellate Body in E.C.-Asbestos
adopted the U.S. Supreme Court approach in dealing with the
"problem" of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.4
I. E. C.-ASBESTOS: THE APPELLATE BODY'S ADDITIONAL
PROCEDURES FOR AMICUS CURIAE SUBMISSIONS
In E.C.-Asbestos, Canada notified the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") of the WTO that it would file an appeal with the
WTO Appellate Body regarding the Panel ruling issued on Octo-
ber 23, 2000.' By November 8, 2000, the Appellate Body had
received thirteen6 unsolicited amicus curiae briefs regarding the
appeal. The Appellate Body rejected and returned all thirteen
unsolicited briefs and issued a letter informing the applicants of
new procedures the Appellate Body had adopted for such sub-
missions.7 These Additional Procedures were issued under Rule
16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review and
gional human rights tribunals have shown the usefulness of amicus curiae briefs in
reaching well reasoned and accurate opinions). For a comparison between the WTO/
GATI and the ICJ, see Nick Covelli, Public International Law and Third Party Participation
in WfO Panel Proceedings, 33J. OF WORLD TRADE, 125 (1999).
4. It is acknowledged that the issue of amicus curiae briefs and NGO participation
are fundamentally linked and interrelated, but this Essay maintains that there is merit
in looking at the issue of amicus curiae briefs as separate and distinct from the broader
question of NGO participation.
5. The Panel ruling in E.C-Asbestos has broken new ground by upholding for the
first time a trade restrictive measure under the General Exceptions of GATT 1994 and
specifically under Article XX (b) of GATT, as necessary for human health. See E. C.-
Asbestos Panel Report para. 9.1; see also Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development?
An Analysis of the WIJO Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberaliza-
tion, 14 AM. U. INr'L L. REv. 1129 (1999) (providing historical review of Article XX
cases prior to E.C.-Asbestos). Although the result of the decision in EC.-Asbestos may
have been pro-environment, the Panel's failure to take into account the varying health
risks posed by the products in its analysis of "like products" under Article 111(4) of
GATT 1994 has raised concerns about the potential negative impact of this decision on
health and safety regulations. See E.C.-Asbestos Panel Report para. 8.130; see also Part I
of this Essay for further discussion.
6. See Amicus Brief Storm Highlights W'O's Unease with External Transparency, 4
BRIDGES 1, 4 (2000); see also Laurie Kazan-Allen, The W17O: Who Needs Friends?, at http:/
/www.ibas.btinternet.co.uk/WTOAmicus.htm.
7. See BRIDGES, supra note 6, at 1.
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stated that they were issued in the "interest of fairness and or-
derly procedure."' The Additional Procedures, most impor-
tantly, provided that all those who intended to submit amicus
curiae briefs would first be required to submit an application for
leave to file such a submission with the Appellate Body.' The
deadline set for the filing of the applications was noon, Novem-
ber 16, 2000.10
Shortly after the Additional Procedures were communicated
and posted on the WTO web site, the members of the WTO"
accused the Appellate Body of acting beyond the scope of its
mandate. The Egyptian Ambassador, acting on behalf of the In-
formal Group of Developing Countries ("IGDC"), asked for a
Special Session of the WTO General Council regarding the Ad-
ditional Procedures adopted by the Appellate Body.1 2 The Spe-
cial Session on the Additional Procedures took place on Novem-
ber 22, 2000 ("Special Session")., The consensus among these
members, with the notable exception of the United States, was
that the issue of amicus curiae briefs was not procedural, but a
substantive one that only members could decide.13 A statement
8. In a communication sent from the Chairman of the Appellate Body to the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Board ("DSB") dated November 8, 2000, inform-
ing the DSB of the Additional Procedures adopted by the Division hearing the appeal
in E.C.-Asbestos, the Appellate Body Chairman stated that:
This additional procedure has been adopted by the Division hearing this ap-
peal for the purposes of this appeal only pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Work-
ing Procedures for Appellate Review, and is not a new working procedure
drawn up by the Appellate Body pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes.
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, Com-
munication from the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Addi-
tional Procedures].
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. The WTO is an inter-governmental organization and membership, is limited
to governments.
The permanent seven-member Appellate Body is set up by the Dispute Settle-
ment Body and broadly represents the range of WTO membership. Members
of the Appellate Body have four-year terms. They have to be individuals with
recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not affiliated
with any government. I
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispue.dispue.htm.
12. See Gustavo Capdevila, Trade: Civil Society Groitps Spark Power Battle within WITO,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2000.
13. See Chakravarthi Raghavan, Will WTO-AB Listen to 'Strong Signal'ftom Members?,
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issued by the IGDC in connection with the Special Session stated
that "while the Appellate Body was entitled to adopt its own
working procedures, this decision of theirs went-beyond an out-
reach activity, seeking information from individuals... not man-
dated by the DSU.'14 The WTO representative, from Pakistan
even went so far as to call for the resignation of the Appellate
Body Chairman. 5
At the Special Session, the .WTO members accused the Ap-
pellate Body of taking actions that were beyond its mandate
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding16 ("DSU"). For
many WTO members, the issuance of the Additional Procedures
was only the latest example of a series of disturbing develop-
ments including the Appellate Body decision to allow accept-
ance of an unsolicited amicus brief in United States Import Prohibi-
tion of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (" U.S.-Shrimp") 7 and
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in United States-Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom ("U.S.-British
Steer.')." The following remarks by the Egyptian Ambassador
convey this sentiment:
It was 'crystal clear' there was no agreement among members
on the issue of amicus curiae briefs-demonstrated during
the DSU over the reports on the Shrimp-Turtle and U.S.
British Steel cases. The WTO is a member driven intergov-
ernmental organization and this basic and fundamental na-
ture of the organization should and will remain as such. 9
Similarly, Ambassador S. Narayanan expressed the concern of
4790 S. N. DEv. MONITOR, (2000); see also BRIDGES, supra note 6. It is noteworthy that
although there are some differences amongst members of the WTO with regards to the
issue of NGO participation, there was consensus on the issue of Appellate Body's lack of
authority in adopting the Additional Procedures.
14. Raghavan, supra note 13.
15. See Kazan-Allen, supra note 6.
16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DSU].
17. United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Panel, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report].
18. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-British SteelAppellate Report].
19. Raghavan, supra note 13.
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many WTO members with the past performance of the "power-
ful Appellate Body":
My friends know that I consider the Appellate Body of the
WTO to be the most powerful institution in the world, more
powerful than the G-8. What the Appellate Body decides has
commercial, economic and social implications for 139 coun-
tries around the world. The power of the Appellate Body
should be frightening to everybody, including the Appellate
Body themselves. The membership has created this powerful
institution in good faith, in the expectation of common good
for all. The membership has always shown well-merited def-
erence to the Appellate Body. Is it too much to expect from
the powerful Appellate Body to show deference to the feel-
ings of almost the entire membership that in accepting unso-
licited amicus curiae briefs and seeking amicus curiae briefs,
the Appellate Body is acting without mandate.2"
At the Special Session, only the United States "whole-heart-
edly backed" the Appellate Body's decision to adopt the Addi-
tional Procedures. 21 According to the U.S. Representative to the
WTO, the Appellate Body "'did the only thing it could do' given
the number of persons that either had already filed or expressed
their intent to file friend of the court briefs. '22 The United
States also stated that the Appellate Body had "merely managed
a situation that already existed in the specific context of the as-
bestos dispute." 2' At the conclusion of the Special Session, the
Chairman of the General Council, Ambassador Kare Bryn of
Norway, stated that he would convey to the Appellate Body "the
sentiments from the meeting that the Appellate Body has to ex-
ercise extreme caution on this issue.
24
The controversy surrounding amicus curiae submissions in
the E.C.-Asbestos dispute raises three important and interre-
lated issues. First, it highlights the increasing power of the Ap-
20. Id. Other commentators, particularly from the developing world, seem to
agree with this view. For example, Mr. Raghavan, editor of the "SUNS," a publication of
the Third World Network, has stated that "the General Council and the WTO member
states should take action to curb the absolute power of the Appellate Body." Capdevila,
supra note 12.
21. See BRIDGES, supra note 6, at 4.
22. Id.
23. See BRIDGES, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that "New Zealand and Switzerland were
the only other members to express 'cautious support' for the Appellate Body's initia-
tive").
24. Raghavan, supra note 13.
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pellate Body that was unforeseen and possibly unintended when
the WTO was established at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. During the short life span of the WTO, the success of
the Appellate Body has been in sharp contrast to the lack of suc-
cess at the inter-governmental level. While the WTO member-
ship has been unable to reach consensus on a variety of issues
including the selection of the WTO Director-General,25 an
agenda for further trade rounds, 6 the linkage of trade to envi-
ronment or labor, 27 and participation of non-governmental or-
ganizations, 28 those very same issues have been raised in the con-
text of specific disputes before the Appellate Body. As a result,
in controversial areas such as trade and environment, the Appel-
late Body has taken a more assertive role than the General Coun-
cil or the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment.29 Sec-
ond, the E. C. -Asbestos dispute demonstrates the continuing op-
position of many governments to NGO participation at the WTO
and the increasing power of international civil society. ° Finally,
the solitary voice of the United States in support of the Appellate
Body can be attributed, at least partly, to the U.S. legal system's
historical familiarity with the institution of amicus curiae and its
evolution from "friend of the court" to 'judicial lobbyist." This
Essay addresses only this third and final issue.
II. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS AT THE WTO
Under the GATT system unsolicited briefs from non-mem-
bers were not accepted. It was argued that the dispute was
strictly between governments and that panelists could only ad-
dress the claims and arguments that were submitted by the par-
ties to the dispute.
25. See John H. Jackson, The Limits of International Trade: Workers'Protection, the En-
vironment and Other Human Rights, 94 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 222, 223 (2000).
26. See David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the 'Millennium Round' in Seattle: Les-
sons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'I & CoMP. L. 349, 352 (2000)
(stating that "[i]t is very difficult to move forward when.., the so called 'Quad' coun-
tries (United States, European Union, Canada, and Japan) disagree even on basic
objectives of a new negotiating round"). See generally id. at 352-57.
27. See id. at 352-53, 364.
28. See id. at 363; see also Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?,
69 FORDHAM L. REv. 345, 350 (2000).
29. See Gantz, supra note 26, at 363.
30. Many articles have been written on the issue of NGO participation at the WTO.
See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 223-24 (1997).
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The WTO dispute settlement system has not followed the
GATT view on unsolicited submissions by non-members. First,
the Appellate Body has held that although the Panels may still
consider only the claims raised by the parties, they can consider
any arguments, including those not raised by the parties, if they
are relevant to the Panel's analysis of a case. 1 Second, Article 13
of the DSU which authorizes WTO panels to "seek information
from any relevant source and.., consult experts to obtain their
opinion,"32 has been interpreted by the Appellate Body to allow
the submission of non-requested or unsolicited briefs.3
A. Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed in WTO Panel Proceedings
Amicus curiae briefs were first filed in the WTO dispute set-
tlement system in two visible and highly controversial cases:
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line 4 ("Reformulated Gasoline") and European Communities-Mea-
sures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)35 ("E. C. -Hor-
31. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); see also European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter E.C.-Hormones Appellate Report].
32. Article 13 (Right to Seek Information) states in full:
(1) Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before
a panel seeks such information or advice from any individual or body
within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that
Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by
a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appro-
priate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed
without formal authorization for the individual, body, or authorities of the
Member providing the information.
(2) Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult
experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With
respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter
raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in
writing from an expert review group.
DSU art. 13 (emphasis added).
33. See generally United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report].
34. See Panel Report, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline
Panel Report] and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [here-
inafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report].
35. See E.C.-Hormones Appellate Report; see also Public Citizen, Institute for Agricul-
ture and Trade Policy, Cancer Prevention Coalition, Community Nutrition Institute,
and Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund, Comments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade
2000] JUDICIAL LOBBYING AT THE WTO
mones"). Both cases raised issues about the right of the WTO
members to promulgate and enforce domestic environmental or
health and safety regulations that conflict with their WTO obli-
gations.36 In both cases, however, the dispute settlement bodies
ignored the NGO submissions.
The question of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs was first37
discussed by the Dispute Settlement Panel in United States-
Shrimp.38 In United States-Shrimp, unsolicited amicus curiae
briefs were submitted by NGOs both to the Panel39 and to the
Appellate Body.4° The Panel rejected all of the unsolicited NGO
submissions, stating that "accepting non-requested information
from non-governmental sources, would be, in our opinion, in-
compatible with the provisions of the DSU as currently ap-
plied."41 The Panel interpreted the word "seek" in Article 13 to
mean only those submissions that were explicitly solicited, i.e.,
requested.42 The Panel also followed GATT philosophy, holding
Organization concerning European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts (Hormones) (Oct. 31, 1997), available at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/gattwto/
Testimonies% 20&% 20Comments/meat.htm.
36. In Reformulated Gasoline, the Gasoline Act of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") of the
United States was found to be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under GATT 1994 and
not justified under the General Exception provisions of Article XX. Although the Ap-
pellate Body reversed the panel ruling that the gasoline rule did not fall within the
terms of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 (i.e., "relating to conservation of an exhaus-
tible natural resource"), it did state that it was not justified under the chapeau of Article
XX. See also Aa'i, supra note 5, 1145-1149. In E.C.-Hormones, the Panel and Appellate
Body held that the EU regulations that ban meat or meat products derived from cattle
who have been administered either natural or synthetic hormones were inconsistent
with the EU obligations under the GATT and Uruguay Round agreements. See E.C.-
Hormones Appellate Report, at 29-30.
37. It must be noted that in E.C. -Hormones, the Appellate Body had already recog-
nized the right of panels to "seek information and advice as they deem appropriate in a
particular case." E. C.-Hormones Appellate Report para. 147.
38. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report. The measure at issue was a U.S. law that pro-
hibited importation of shrimp or shrimp products into the United States that had been
caught without the use of Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs"). Id.
39. The following NGOs filed submissions in Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report: Center for
International Environmental Law, Center for Marine Conservation, Environmental
Foundation Ltd., Mangrove Action Project, Philippine Ecological Network, and Nac-
cional de Accion Ecologia. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report para. 155.
40. The following NGOs filed submissions in U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report: Center
for International Environmental Law, Center for Marine Conservation, The Environ-
mental Foundation Ltd., The Philippine Ecological Network, the Naccional de Accion
Ecologia, the World Wildlife Fund, International, and the Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development. See U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report paras. 79, 99.
41. Id. para. 96.
42. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report para. 7.8.
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that the dispute system is inter-governmental and that "it is usual
practice for the parties to put forward whatever documents they
considered relevant to support their case."43 The Panel further
stated that if any of the parties wanted to use or rely on the argu-
ments made by the NGOs they should be included as part of
their own submissions. 44
On appeal, the United States argued that the Panel in
United States-Shrimp had erred in finding that it could not ac-
cept non-requested submissions from NGOs. 45  The United
States argued that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article
13 of the DSU 46 by concluding that it only applied to requested
or solicited submissions. The Appellate Body agreed with the
United States and reversed the Panel's decision on this issue.4 7
The Appellate Body stated that although under the DSU, "access
to the dispute settlement process of the WTO is limited to the
Members of the WTO"48 and non-members do not have a "legal
right" to participate,49 the Panel's interpretation of the word
"seek" in Article 13 of the DSU was "unnecessarily formal and
technical."5 According to the Appellate Body, under Article 13
a Panel has the discretion to look at or ignore any information,
including submissions by NGOs, irrespective of whether such in-
formation was requested.51
43. Id. para. 7.8.
44. See id. The Panel stated that "if any party in the present dispute wanted to put
forward these documents [NGO amicus curiae briefs], or parts of them, as part of their
own submissions to the Panel, they were free to do so. If this were the case, the other
parties, would have two weeks to respond to the additional materials." Id. para. 7.8.
45. See U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report para. 9.
46. See id.
47. See id. paras. 108, 110; see also para. 107.
48. Id. para. 101 (stating that "[t]his access is not available, under the W'O agree-
ment and the covered agreements as they currently exist, to individuals or international
organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental").
49. See id. It states in full:
[Ulnder the DSU, only Members who are parties to the dispute, or who have
notified their interest in becoming third parties in such a dispute to the DSB,
have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a legal right, to have those
submissions considered by, a panel. Correlatively, a panel is obliged in law to
accept and give due consideration only to submissions made by the parties
and the third parties in a panel proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. para. 107.
51. The Appellate Body specifically stated:
[A]uthority to seek information is not properly equated with a prohibition on
accepting information which has been submitted without having been re-
[Vol. 24:62
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In addition, the Appellate Body set certain standards for
consideration of amicus curiae briefs by Panels, including "the
relevancy" and "acceptability" of the information and advice re-
ceived in each submission.5 2 Based on such criteria, a Panel
would determine what weight, if any, should be given to the sub-
mission.53 Should a panel decide to accept a submission, the
Panel is not obliged to consider the submission in rendering its
decision. Specifically, the Appellate Body found that it is appro-
priate that some submissions should ultimately be given no
weight.54
In United States-Shrimp, the Appellate Body did not explic-
itly address the issue of whether the Appellate Body itself has
authority to accept the amicus curiae briefs because the United
States had attached the three amicus curiae briefs as exhibits to
its main submission. The Unites States stated that the amicus
curiae briefs were incorporated into the main U.S. submission
only to the extent that they were consistent with the arguments
made by the U.S. submission.55 As a result of this disclaimer, the
Appellate Body looked only at the main U.S. submission. The
Appellate Body further stated that when an amicus curiae brief is
attached to a party submission it becomes "an integral part of
the participant's submission."56
On appeal, India, Pakistan, and Thailand objected to the
U.S. position on unsolicited NGO submissions, arguing that al-
lowing unsolicited briefs to be filed deprives the Panel of its
right to decide whether it needs supplemental information and
of what type. Perhaps more importantly, it "deprives [WTO]
Members of their right to know that information is being sought
from within their jurisdiction."57 The Appellees further stated
that to allow unsolicited amicus curiae to be filed would "deluge"
the Panel with information that "might be strongly biased if na-
tionals from Members involved in a dispute could provide unso-
quested by a panel. A panel has the discretionary authority either to accept
and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it, whether re-
quested by a panel or not.
Id. para 108.
52. See id. para. 106.
53. See id. para. 104.
54. See id.
55. See id. para. 86. (citing to U.S. letter to the Appellate Body).
56. Id. para. 89.
57. US.-Shrimp Appellate Report para. 109.
2000]
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licited information.""8 In other words, India, Thailand, and Pa-
kistan were concerned that the acceptance of unsolicited submis-
sions from NGOs would become a form of judicial lobbying.
As a third party participant, the E.C. also disagreed with the
U.S. interpretation of Article 13 by stating that although Article
13 gives panels the "pro-active discretion" 9 to "seek", informa-
tion from other sources, it "wonders whether the text of the DSU
could be interpreted so widely as to give non-governmental orga-
nizations the right to file submissions directly to a Panel."60
Although the Appellate Body ultimately ruled against the
United States in United States-Shrimp, the Appellate Body's
agreement with the U.S. position on unsolicited submissions by
NGOs has been widely criticized by many developing countries'
governments. 61 In connection with the Appellate Body ruling in
United States-Shrimp, an Indian representative stated that India
will not tolerate "eco-imperialism" through the WTO. 62 Further-
more, many developing countries believe that NGO participa-
tion through amicus curiae briefs is only part of the push by the
West to broaden the trade mandate to include labor and envi-
ronmental concerns.
In 1998, in Australia-Import Prohibition on Salmon from Ca-
nada ("Australia-Salmon"), the Panel 'Sought expert advice under
Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11 of the SPS Agreement.6" In
Australia-Salmon the use of solicited amicus curiae briefs was not
controversial as it was clearly authorized by even a restricted in-
terpretation of Article 13. The Panel noted that:
58. Id. para. 32.
59. Id. para. 65.
60. Id.
61. See Sukumar Muralidharan, In Search of Consensus, FRONTLINE, June 6-19, 1998,
at http://www.fguardians.org/flmain.html (stating that "[t]he developing countries
rightly view the Western effort to inscribe intrusive labor and environmental standards
into the rule-book as an effort to neutralize their comparative advantage in world
trade").
62. Ala'i, supra note 5, at 1171 n.185 (citing to Cato Center for Trade.Policy Stud-
ies Real Audio and Video Archives, The WPO's Shrimp-Turtle Decision: Free Trade v. the
Environment? at http://www.freetrade.org/realmedia/realmedia.html).
63. See Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Panel, WT/
DS18/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon Panel Report]. In this case, Ca-
nada objected to the Australian prohibition on the importation of fresh, chilled or
frozen salmon from Canada under Quarantine Proclamation 86A ("QP86A"). QP86A
prohibited importation unless the fish or parts of the fish have been subject to treat-
ment. Under this rule importation of heat treated salmon products was permitted. Id.
para 2.14.
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In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or
technical issues, a panel should seek advice from experts cho-
sen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dis-
pute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropri-
ate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult
with the relevant international organizations, at the request
of either'party to the dispute 'or on its own initiative ... both
parties indicated that they had no objection to the Panel seek-
ihg advice.64
Therefore, the Panel invited the parties to submit names of indi-
vidual experts in the subject matter before the Panel. In addi-
tion, the Panel sought names of individuals from the Office In-
ternational des Epizooties ("OIE").65 Subsequently, the Parties
were given an opportunity to comment on the list of experts and
to state "any compelling objections" they may have to a particu-
lar individual listed.66 Finally, the Panel selected four individuals
from the list "taking into account the comments of the parties"67
and requested them to advise the Panel in their individual per-
sonal capacities.68 Once the experts were selected, the Panel, "in
consultation with the parties,"69 prepared questions that were
submitted to each expert along with a request that responses be
provided in writing. The parties also agreed to supply the ex-
perts with the written submissions of the parties. The parties
were then given an opportunity to comment on the experts' writ-
ten responses. 70 Finally' the experts were "invited to meet with
the Panel and the parties to discuss their written responses to the
questions and to provide further information. 71
In sum, Australia-Salmon's use of amici is acceptable to the
WTO membership. WTO members are in agreement that Arti-
64. Id. para. 6.1 (emphasis added).
65. See id. para. 6.2.
66. Id. para. 6.3.
67. Id. para. 6.3.
68. The individuals selected were Dr. David E. Burmaster, Alceon Corporation,
United States; Dr. Christopher Rodgers, fish disease consultant, Spain; Dr. James Win-
ton, National Fisheries and Research Center, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, United
States; and Dr. Marion Wooldridge, Department of Risk Research, Central Veterinary
Laboratory, United Kingdom.
69. Australia-Salmon Panel Report para. 6.4.
70. See id. para. 6.4.
71. Id. paras. 6.4-6.5. The summary of the expert written submission was included
in the -Panel Report as was the transcript of the meeting with the experts that was at-
tached as Annex 2 to the Panel Report.
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cle 13 authorizes solicited expert advice. It is even less objection-
able when such advice is sought with the advice and consent of
the parties. For most of the 'ATO membership this is the only
context in which Article 13 authorizes the submission of amicus
curiae briefs before the Panel. Proponents of this narrow view
argue that such use of solicited expert advice on factual issues
does not interfere with the inter-governmental nature of the
VTO.
7 2
Following Australia-Salmon, amicus curiae briefs were filed
before WTO panels in United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Cop-
yright Act 73 ("U.S.-Copyright"), E.C.-Asbestos,74 and European
Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India75 ("E.C.-Bed Linen"). In U.S.-Copyright the
Panel received a copy of a letter sent to the U.S. Trademark Reg-
ister from a law firm representing the American Society for Com-
posers Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"). The U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative had asked for information from ASCAP in relation to
certain questions that had been asked of the United States by the
Panel. Upon receipt of the letter, the Panel sent copies to both
parties and asked them to comment on it if they wished.76 Sub-
sequently, the United States distanced itself from the "positions
expressed in the letter by that law firm and emphasized that in
its view the letter was of little probative value for the Panel, be-
cause it provided essentially no factual data not already provided
by either party. ' 77 Although disagreeing with the position of the
ASCAP, the United States "supported in general the right of pri-
vate parties to make their views known to the 'ATO dispute set-
tlement panels."7"
72. See DSU. In addition, the experts were limited in their written submissions to
questions asked by the Panel. Both parties agreeing to expert participation were al-
lowed to respond to submissions made by the experts.
73. United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Report of the Panel, WT/
DS160/R (Jun. 15, 2000) [hereinafter US.-Copyright Panel Report]. E.C. complained
that the "home style receiver exemption" to the U.S. Copyright Act, which provided
that licenses were not necessary for public performances in restaurants, bars, stores etc.,
was in violation of certain WTO TRIPS obligations. Id.
74. See E. C.-Asbestos Panel Report.
75. European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, Report of the Panel, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000) [hereinafter E.C.-Bed
Linen Panel Report].
76. See U.S.-Copyright Panel Report paras. 6.3-6.4.
77. Id. para. 6.5.
78. Id.
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The E.C. stated that it had no substantive comments on the
letter and agreed with the United States that "the letter did not
add any new element to what was already submitted by the par-
ties."79 The E.C., however, did reiterate that the scope of Article
13 of the DSU was limited solely to issues of fact and not law,
stating:
[T] he authority of the Panels is limited to the consideration
of factual information and technical advice by individuals or
bodies alien to the dispute and thus did not include the possi-
bility for a panel to accept any legal argument or legal inter-
pretation from such individuals or bodies.
8 0
In response, the Panel decided to "not reject outright the infor-
mation contained in the letter from the law firm representing
ASCAP," but agreed that the "letter essentially duplicates infor-
mation already submitted by the parties" and stated that "we
have not relied on it for our reasoning or our findings."'"
In E. C.-Bed Linens, the Panel accepted an amicus curiae
submission by Dr. Konrad Neund6rfer on behalf of Foreign
Trade Association but refused, once again, to "take the submis-
sion into account" in reaching its decision.12 The Panel did not
explain its decision noting only that copies of the submission
were made available to the parties for comment and that no
party made any substantive comment regarding the submission.
Recognizing the past positions of E.C. and India with regard to
non-solicited amicus curiae submissions, 3 it is logical to assume
that both parties would have objected to considering the submis-
sion on technical grounds.
In E. C.-Asbestos, the Panel initially received four amicus cu-
riae briefs from the following non-governmental organizations
in the months of May and July, 1999: Collegium Ramazzini, Ban
Asbestos Network, Instituto Mexicano de Fibro-Industrias A.C.,
and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
79. Id. para. 6.6.
80. Id.
81. Id. para. 6.8. The Panel also made a point of emphasizing that the "letter was
not addressed to the Panel but only copied to it." Id.
82. See EC-Bed Linen Panel Report para. 6.1, n.10 (stating that the panel did not
find it necessary to take the submission into account in reaching decision in this dis-
pute).
83. See U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report.
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trial Organizations ("AFL-CIO").84 Almost one year later, on
June 27, 2000, the Panel received a fifth amicus curiae brief from
Only Nature Endures ("ONE"), an NGO situated in Mumbai, In-
dia.85 The submission by ONE was rejected by the Panel for hav-
ing been submitted too late in the proceedings.86 The Panel
stated that in view of the provisions of the DSU, "[t]his brief had
been submitted at a stage in the proceedings when it could no
longer be taken into account. ' S7 It, therefore, decided not to
accept the request of ONE and informed the organization ac-
cordingly.
The E.C. incorporated by reference in its rebuttal the sub-
mission of the Collegium Ramazzini and subsequently stated
that it was incorporating by reference the amicus brief submitted
by the AFL-CIO, stating that that body supported the E.C.'s sci-
entific and legal arguments" in that dispute.88 The E.C. pro-
posed that the Panel reject the submissions from the Ban Asbes-
tos Network and the Instituto Mexicano de Fibro-Industrias A.C.
as having no relevance to the dispute. Canada argued that all
four amicus curiae briefs should be rejected for being submitted
too late.89
The Panel decided "not to take into account the amicus cu-
riae briefs submitted respectively by the Ban Asbestos Network
and by the Instituto Mexicano de Fibro-Industrias A.C."60 The
Panel decided to take into account only those submissions that
the E.C. had decided to include in their own submission, i.e.,
submissions by Collegium Ramazzain and the American Federa-
tion of Labor and Congress for Industrial Organizations. 1 Ca-
nada was given an opportunity to respond in writing and orally
to the arguments raised in those two amicus curiae briefs. In the
84. See E. C. -Asbestos Panel Report para. 6.1.
85. See Kazan-Allen, supra note 6 (stating that ONE is an "unknown group" whose
director "travels the world spreading disinformation about asbestos").
86. See E.C-Asbestos Panel Report paras. 6.4, 8.14.
87. Id. para. 8.14. The Panel nevertheless provided the parties with copies of the
submission while informing them of its decision and also "informed the parties that the
same decision would apply to any briefs received from non-governmental organizations
between that point and the end of the procedure." Id.
88. Id. para. 6.2 (emphasis added).
89. See id. All the submissions were received in the months of May and July 1999,
while the Panel was established on November 25, 1998. See id. para. 6.1 (giving dates of
submissions); see also para. 1.3 (giving date of establishment of Panel).
90. Id. para. 8.13.
91. See id. para. 8.12.
[Vol. 24:62
JUDICIAL LOBBYING AT THE WTO
end, the Panel accepted four out of the five amicus curiae sub-
missions, and of the four accepted, took into account only those
two that had been incorporated by reference into the submis-
sions of a party.9
2
It is noteworthy that the E.C. decided to forego its argument
that Article 13 is limited to issues of fact by incorporating in its
main submission not only the factual arguments but also the le-
gal arguments contained in two amicus curiae briefs. Similarly,
the fact/law distinction was not raised by Canada, who requested
that it be given an opportunity to respond to both the factual
and legal issues raised by the amicus curiae briefs should the
Panel decide to accept those briefs.
In sum, following U.S.-Shrimp, Panels do not reject unsolic-
ited amicus submissions on the basis that they are not authorized
under Article 13 of the DSU. Many Panels have chosen, how-
ever, to use their discretion by ignoring such submissions. The
United States has consistently supported the use of amicus cu-
riae briefs before Panels arguing that such briefs can address
both factual and legal issues. In U.S.-Copyright, the United States
supported the right of a U.S. based organization to file an ami-
cus even though the positions expressed by the amici were in-
consistent with the positions of the United States government.
B. Amicus Curiae Briefs filed in Appellate Body Proceedings
In United States-British Steel,93 an industrial NGO, American
Iron and Steel Institute, submitted an amicus curiae brief to the
Panel. The Panel rejected the submission as untimely because it
had been submitted after. the Panel's second meeting with the
parties.94 On appeal, however, the Appellate Body accepted the
amicus curiae briefs from the same business NGO, as well as an-
other from the Specialty Steel Industry of North America.95 The
92. See id. paras. 8.12, 8.13.
93. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Panel, WT/
DS138/R (Dec. 23, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-British Steel Panel Report]. The Panel was
established to consider a complaint by the E.C. with respect to countervailing duties
imposed by the United States on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel prod-
ucts (leaded bars) originating in U.K. The subsidies countervailed relate principally to
equity infusions granted by the British Government to a state-owned company, British
Steel Corporation. Id. para. 2.5.
94. See id. para. 6.3.
95. See U.S.-British Steel Appellate Report para. 4.2.
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Appellate Body rejected the European Communities argument
that amicus curiae briefs are "inadmissible" in appellate review
proceedings.96 The E.C. argued, as it had in U.S.-Shrimp, that
the basis for amicus curiae briefs in Panel proceedings is Article
13 of the DSU and Article 13 is only applicable to Panel proceed-
ings and not Appellate Body proceedings. Therefore, the E.C.
argued, the Appellate Body has no authority to accept such sub-
missions.97 The E.C. noted that Article 13 of the DSU applied to
"factual information and technical advice" and did not include "legal
arguments or legal interpretations received from non-members."98
Furthermore, the E.C. argued:
[N] either the DSU nor the [Appellate Body] Working Proce-
dures allow amicus curiae briefs to be admitted in Appellate
Body proceedings, given that Article 17.4 of the DSU ... con-
fine(s) participation in an appeal to participants and third
participants, and that Article 17.10 of the DSU provides for
the confidentiality of Appellate Body proceedings.
99
Brazil and Mexico, as third party participants, agreed with
the E.C. Brazil and Mexico distinguished between issues of fact
and law and stated that Article 13 of the DSU contemplates the
Panel receiving only factual information from other non-mem-
ber sources and that there is nothing in either the DSU or the
Working Procedures of the Appellate Body that would authorize
receipt of briefs from private entities "containing legal argu-
ments on the issues under appeal."100 Mexico further argued
that the Working Procedures and the DSU limit participation in
the appellate proceedings, excluding countries who were not
parties or third parties during the Panel proceeding from join-
ing at the appeals level, and that this limitation is another reason
why amicus curiae briefs may not be accepted on the Appellate
level.' Brazil further argued that the "[m]embers of the WTO
and, in particular, parties and third parties, are uniquely quali-
fied to make legal arguments regarding Panel reports and the
96. See id. para. 36 (stating that "[o]n 15 February 2000, the European Communi-
ties filed a letter arguing that the amicus curiae briefs are 'inadmissible' in appellate
review proceedings, and stating that it did not intend to respond to the content of the
briefs" by the two U.S. industrial NGOs).
97. See id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. para. 37.
101. See id.
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parameters of the WTO obligations.""1 2 The argument was that
member governments have a unique understanding of their
WTO obligations because they had negotiated the Uruguay
Round agreements. Furthermore, it was argued, only members
were intimately involved in the Panel proceedings from which
the appeal was taken and, as a result, were most aware of the
contents of their submissions and the issues on appeal.
The United States disagreed with the positions of the E.C.,
Brazil, and Mexico and argued that the Appellate Body had the
authority to accept amicus curiae submissions by the steel indus-
try associations."' The United States argued that, as the Appel-
late Body had stated in U.S.-Shrimp, Article 13 provided the
Panels with "ample and extensive.authority to undertake and to control
the process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of
the dispute and of the legal norms and principles applicable to
such facts."1 4 According to the United States Article 13 permits
Panels to receive expert information on issues of law and fact.
The United States further argued that the Appellate Body's au-
thority to accept amicus curiae submissions is authorized under
Article 17.9 of the DSU,1°5 which allows the Appellate Body to
draw upon its own working procedures, and Rule 16(1) of the
Working Procedures,0 6 which authorizes the Appellate Body to
"create appropriate procedures when a question arises that is
not covered by the Working Procedures."10 7 Finally, the United
States disagreed with the E.C., Brazil, and Mexico that accept-
ance of unsolicited amicus curiae briefs would "compromise the
confidentiality of the Appellate Body proceedings, or give
greater right to a non-WTO member than to WTO members
who are not participants or third participants in an appeal."' 8
The Appellate Body in U.S.-British Steel once again agreed
102. Id. para. 37.
103. See id. para. 38.
104. Id. para. 38 (citing U.S.-Shrimp Appellate Report para. 106) (emphasis added
by the United States).
105. DSU art. 17.9 (stating that "[w]orking Procedures shall be drawn up by the
Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-Gen-
eral, and communicated to the Members for their information").
106. WTO, Working Proceduresfor Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/3 (Feb. 28, 1997),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab3_e.htm [hereinafter
Working Procedures].
107. U.S.-British Steel Appellate Report para. 38.
108. Id.
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with the United States on the issue of amicus curiae briefs. First,
the Appellate Body stated that although nothing in the DSU spe-
cifically authorizes it to accept or consider amicus curiae briefs
from outside sources, "neither the DSU nor the Working Proce-
dures explicitly prohibit acceptance or consideration of such
briefs."' 9 The Appellate Body went on to state that Article 17.9
of the DSU provides the Appellate Body with "broad authority to
adopt procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and
procedures of the DSU or the covered agreements"" 0 and, in
addition, Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures "authorizes a
division to create an appropriate procedure when a question
arises that is not covered by the Working Procedures." '' The
Appellate Body concluded that it does not have a "legal duty" to
accept submissions from non-WTO members' 1 2 but it has "the
legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider
any information that we believe is pertinent and useful in an ap-
peal." 13 Finally, however, the Appellate Body concluded that in
US.-British Steel it was not necessary to take the two amicus cu-
riae briefs into account in rendering its decision.' 14
Following U.S.-British Steel, the role of amicus curiae briefs
at the Appellate Body came up again in E.C.-Asbestos. As men-
tioned earlier, consistent with its position on amicus curiae sub-
missions in U.S.-British Steel, the Appellate Body in E.C.-Asbes-
tos relied on Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures to promul-
gate Additional Procedures for the acceptance of amicus curiae
briefs. These Additional Procedures were communicated to all
participants and third participants as well as the Chairman of the
Dispute Settlement Body on November 8, 2000. 15 The three
members of the Appellate Body who established the rules made
it clear that the rules Were adopted "for the purposes of this ap-
peal only," and that the rules were not additions to the working
procedures of the Appellate Body." 6 The Additional Proce-
dures provided that "[a]ny person, whether natural or legal,
109. Id. para. 39.
110. Id.
111. Id. para. 38.
112. Id. para. 41.
113. Id. para. 39.
114. See id. para. 42.
115. See Additional Procedures.
116. Id.
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other than a party or a third party to this dispute ... must apply
for leave to file such a brief from the Appellate Body by noon on
Thursday, November 16, 2000."17 The Additional Procedures
made it clear that no one would be permitted to file an amicus
curiae brief who had failed to file an application for leave and
such leave had been granted.
Section 3 of the Additional Procedures further stated what
information an application for leave should include."i  Among
the information requested was detailed information about the
applicant, its activities, membership and sources of funding, in-
terest of the applicant in the proceedings, disclosure of all infor-
mation about any relationship the applicant may have to any of
the parties or third parties and any financial assistance or contri-
bution made to the applicant in preparation of this application
or the brief by a party or any third party, and identification of
the specific legal issues that are the subject of this appeal that
the applicant intends to address in its brief."9 Perhaps the most
difficult information requested from an applicant was contained
in part 3(f) of the Additional Procedures, which "indicate, in
particular, in what way the applicant will make a contribution to
the resolution of this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of
117. Id. para. 2.
'118. Article 3 of the Additional Procedure provides:
An application for leave to file such a written brief shall:
(a) be, made in writing, be dated and signed by the applicant, and include the
address and 6ther'contact details of the applicant;
(b) be'in no case longer than -three typed pages;
(c) contain a description of the -applicant, including a statement of the mem-
bership and' legal status of the applicant, the general objectives pursued
by the applicant, the nature of the activities of the applicant, and the
sources of financing 'of the applicant;
(d) specify the nature of the interest the applicant has in this appeal;
(e) identify the specific issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal
interpretations developed by the Panel that are the subject of this appeal
... which the applicant intends to address in its written brief;
(f) indicate, in particular, in what way the applicant will make a contribution
to the resolution of this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what
has been already submitted by a party or third party to this dispute; and
(g) contain a statement disclosing whether the applicant has any relationship,
direct or indirect, with any party or any third party to this dispute, as well
as whether it has, or will, receive any assistance, financial or otherwise,
from a party or a third party to this dispute in preparation of its applica-
tion for leave or its written brief.
Id.
119. See Additional Procedures.
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what is already submitted by a party or third party to this dis-
pute. ' 12° The Additional Procedures further provided that ap-
plication for leave could not exceed three pages. 12' They also
set forth procedural rules that must be followed by those whose
application for leave is granted, i.e., page limit, deadline for sub-
mission, form of such submissions, etc. The Additional Proce-
dures also state that "[t]he grant of leave to file a brief by the
Appellate Body does not imply that the Appellate Body will ad-
dress, in its Report, the legal arguments made in such a brief.'
22
It is estimated that seventeen groups and one individual
submitted applications for leave to file an amicus curiae brief by
the deadline.1 23 However, almost immediately after the deadline
the Appellate Body shocked the NGO community by rejecting all
applications and stating only the following:
Please be advised that we have reviewed and considered your
application, in accordance with the Additional Procedure
adopted by this Division . . .and that your application for
leave to file a written brief in this appeal has been denied for
failure to comply sufficiently with all the requirements set
forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure.'2 4
Many of the applicants requested an explanation from the
Appellate Body, asking the Body to "specify which of the require-
ments set forth in the individual sub-paragraphs of paragraph
three of the Additional Procedure" they had failed to comply
with and the Appellate Body's reasoning in reaching that conclu-
120. See id.
121. See id. para. 3(b).
122. Id. para. 5.
123. See BRIDGES, supra note 6, at I (stating that 13 were submitted before the new
rule was promulgated). A complete list is not available, particularly a listing of indus-
trial or business NGOs, however the following NGOs and individual publicly stated that
they had filed applications with the Appellate Body and have had their applications
rejected (1) The American Public Health Association, (2) The Society of Occupational
and Environmental Health ("SOEH"), (3) The Occupational and Environmental Dis-
eases Association, (4) The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
("ICFT-U"), (5) The European Trade Union Confederation ("ETUC"), (6) The Austra-
lian Centre for Environmental Law, (7) The International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, (8)
the Ban Asbestos Virtual Network, (9) Greenpeace International, (10) Worldwide
Fund, (11) Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, (12)
The Center for International Environmental Law, and (13) Robert L. Howse, Professor
of International Law at the University of Michigan Law School. See id.
124. Letter from Appellate Body Members Florention Fleiciano, James Bacchus, and Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, (Nov. 16, 2000), at http://www.ibas.btinternet.co.uk/
WTORejection.htm.
[Vol. 24:62
JUDICIAL LOBBYING AT THE WTO
sion.125 The Secretariat of the Appellate Body, Ms. Debra Ste-
ger, responded to these requests for more information by stating
that "we are unable at this time to provide you with the addi-
tional information you request... This information will be pro-
vided in full in the Report of the Appellate Body which will be
available at the completion of this appeal."126 This letter was
written after the Special Session that had been held specifically
to condemn the Appellate Body's issuance of the Additional Pro-
cedures. 1
27
At the time of the writing of this Essay, the Appellate Body
has not yet issued its decision in E.C.-Asbestos. It is clear, how-
ever, that the rejection of these briefs has so far been premised
on noncompliance with the Additional Procedures, i.e., Section
3 of the Additional Procedures.
28
C. Conclusion
The use of amicus curiae briefs at the WTO is a recent and
controversial phenomenon. There is emerging consensus on
the issue of amicus curiae submissions before WTO Panels. Arti-
cle 13 of the DSU explicitly authorizes Panels to "seek" expert
advice from outside sources. The Appellate Body has inter-
preted this to mean that Panels have discretion to accept and
take into account solicited or unsolicited NGO submissions. By
the same token, the Appellate Body has held that NGOs can sub-
mit unsolicited briefs to Panels but that Panels are under no ob-
ligation to take such submissions into account in rendering their
decisions. To date, unsolicited amicus curiae submissions have
only been taken into account to the extent that they have been
made part of a party's submission.
In contrast, there is no consensus on the issue of amicus
125. See, e.g., Letter from Jacob Weksman on behalf of the Foundation for International
Environmental Law & Development (SOAS) and Matthew Stilwell on behalf of the Center for
International Environmental Law (Nov. 21, 2000), at http://www.ibas.btinternet.co.uk/
WTOQuestion.htm.
126. See, e.g., Letter from Debra Steger to Ms. Tait (Nov. 28, 2000), at http://
www.ibas.btinternet.co.uk/WTO Enq_.Response_ .htm.
127. Capdevila, supra note 12.
128. We know that the Appellate Body has rejected all amicus curiae briefs. It was,
however, at no time under any legal obligation to take into account those amicus curiae
briefs even if it had accepted the application for leave to 'file such petitions. Certain
non-governmental organizations involved in the process have indicated to the author
that they plan to nevertheless file amicus curiae briefs.
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curiae briefs at the Appellate level. The Appellate Body has
ruled that it is authorized to accept amicus curiae submissions
and has determined that it has authority to issue procedural
rules with regards to such submissions. To date, however, the
Appellate Body has not taken into account any amicus submis-
sion that had not already been attached to a party's submission.
For the Appellate Body, the submission of amicus curiae briefs is
a procedural question that deserves a procedural answer. For
the rest of the WTO membership, amicus curiae submissions at
the Appellate Body level is a substantive question that can only
be decided at the General Council or inter-governmental level
on a substantive level.
III. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS IN THE UNITED STATES
This section examines the U.S. Supreme Court experience
with amicus curiae submissions and how the court has chosen to
deal with such submissions. The hope is that such an examina-
tion will enable us to better understand the "procedural" solu-
tion to the amicus curiae question that was adopted by the Ap-
pellate Body in E.C.--Asbestos and also shed some light on the
institution of amicus curiae from a U.S. perspective.
A. Amicus Curiae at Common Law
The use of amicus curiae briefs dates back to Roman law.1 29
"The function of the amicus curiae at common law was one of
oral 'shepardizing"' or "the bringing up of cases not known to
the judge."13 Amicus curiae also included testimony by those
who had been involved in the legislative process and in cases
where the meaning of a statute was at issue. 1 ' Any bystander,
including non-lawyers, was allowed to appear as amicus curiae if
129. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
L.J. 694 (1962).
130. Id. at 695. Also evidenced by the Holthouse's Law Dictionary definition cited
by Krislov: "When a judge is doubtful or mistaken in matter of law, a bystander may
inform the court thereof as amicus curiae. Counsel in court frequently act in this ca-
pacity when they happen to be in possession of a case which the judge has not seen or
does not at the moment remember." Id.
131. For example, in Horton & Ruesby, Comb., Sir George Treby, a member of the
British Parliament, informed the court that he had been present at the passage of a
statute and wished to inform the court of the intent of the Parliament in passing the
legislation as an amicus curiae. In that case the meaning of the statute was at issue and
the amicus curiae was allowed. See 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B. 1686).
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they possessed either a knowledge of the fact or the law that was
deemed by the court to be relevant in achieving a just result.1 3 2
Historically an amicus curiae "did not even have to be an attor-
ney to intervene, and the general attitude of the courts was to
welcome such aid, since 'it is for the honor of a court of justice
to avoid error.' "133
Historically, amicus curiae briefs dealt primarily with issues
of law rather than fact. A 1921 Harvard Law Review Note, Ami-
cus Curiae, explains:
Upon any question of law an amicus curiae may inform the
court in any manner open to a party. The court's knowledge
of domestic law is less uncertain now than when the custom
of amici curiae originated. But greater certainty is more than
counterbalanced by increased complexity. Briefs of amici cu-
riae are often submitted where the court feels that the case is
of exceptional moment and demands unusually careful con-
sideration. In such a brief, cases are cited and points of law
presented ... It would even seem that if a statute is ambigu-
ous an amicus curiae might introduce proper evidence of the
intention of the legislators.
Many of the orthodox definitions of the amicus curiae would
draw the line here, for they confine the suggestions which he
[the amicus curiae] may make to "matters of law."' 3 4
It further provides:
The essential purpose of the amicus curiae, as his name im-
plies, is not to represent the interests of any person, but to
assist the Court. Whatever a court may know or do on its own
initiative an amicus curiae may suggest, and it is usually imma-
terial who prompts him to appear. 135
The permission to participate as 'an amicus curiae has. always
been a privilege or "grace" and has never been a "right.' 3 6 The
historical reason for the need at common law for amicus curiae
briefs has been attributed to the reluctance of common law
judges to allow third parties to intervene in proceedings. 137
132. See Krislov, supra note 129, at 695.
133. Id.
134. Note, Amicus Curiae, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 773, 774 (1921).
135. Id. at 775-76.
136. Krislov, supra note 129, at 695.
137. See id. at 696.
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B. The U.S. Experience with Amicus Curiae
Early U.S. cases continued the common law tradition of not
allowing third party interventions in suits between parties.
Therefore, the number of amicus curiae appearances in cases
continued to grow. 138 The amicus curiae first appeared on the
U.S. scene in 1821 in Green v. Biddle,'39 a case involving land
holdings in Kentucky where the court suspected collusion.
Henry Clay was the amicus curiae. By 1905, the U.S. Supreme
Court had stated the following regarding the criteria used by the
Court in granting applications for leave to file an amicus curiae:
Leave to file briefs in a pending case as amicus curiae will be
denied where it does not appear that the applicant is inter-
ested in any other case which will be effected by the decision,
and the parties are represented by competent counsel, whose
consent has not been secured. 4 °
The next major development occurred in 1933 in Florida v. Geor-
gia141 where the U.S. government was allowed to participate as
amicus curiae.142
By 1938, increased interest in amicus curiae participation
forced the U.S. Supreme Court to formulate written rules gov-
erning amicus curiae participation. In 1939, the U.S. Supreme
Court promulgated its rules on submission of amicus curiae
briefs, which provided:
A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed when accompanied
by written consent of all parties to the case, except that con-
sent need not be had when the brief is presented by the
United States or an officer or agency thereof and sponsored
by the Solicitor General, or by a State or a political subdivi-
sion thereof. Such briefs must bear the name of a member of
138. It is also argued that the growth was due to the fact that the common law
restriction on third party intervention was "exacerbated by the American system" where
the "creation of a complex federal system meant... an even greater number of conflict-
ing public interests were potentially unrepresented in the course of private suits." Kris-
lov, supra note 129, at 697.
139. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) at 17.
140. HANNIS TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, (1905) (citing to Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555
(1903)).
141. 58 U.S. 478 (1854).
142. See id. at 495.
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the bar of this court. 1 4 3
The 1939 Rule departed from the common law practice that had
allowed non-lawyers to also appear as an amicus curiae.144 In
addition, it acknowledged the unique role that the government
had played in safeguarding the public interest by allowing only
the federal or state governments to file without consent of the
parties. 4 During the first half of the 20th century amicus curiae
briefs were filed in 10% of U.S. Supreme Court cases.14 6
By the late 1940s, an amicus curiae had evolved from being
a disinterested bystander acting as a "friend of the court" to an
advocate acting on behalf of a client whose interest may or may
not be the same as one of the parties. This change was noted in
1946 in Universal Oil Products v. Root Refrigerating Co. when the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that an amicus curiae
serves "two masters, the court and the client."147 This was the
point in U.S. history when "the institution of the amicus curiae
brief moved from "neutrality to partisanship, from friendship to
advocacy. "148
Shortly after the evolution of amicus curiae from "friend of
the court" to "advocate," the U.S. Supreme Court issued new and
143. Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 27.9., 306 U.S. 685,
708-09 (1939).
144. See Krislov, supra note 129, at 703.
145. See Revised Rules of The Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 143.
146. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 744 (2000); see also id. at 788.
147. See Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref Co., 328 U.S. 575, 581 (1946) (noting that
"[w]hile the amici formally served the court, they were in fact in the pay of private
clients").
148. This transition from "friendship to advocacy" is evident from the evolving def-
inition of amicus curiae in legal dictionaries. The older definition of amicus curiae
found in Abbott's Dictionary of Terms and Phrases was "[a] friend of the court. A term
applied to a bystander, who without having an interest in the cause, of his own knowl-
edge makes suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the information of the presiding
judge." Krislov, supra note 129, at 694-95 (citing Abbott's Dictionary of Terms and
Phrases). Today, Black's Law Dictionary defines amicus curiae as "a person with a
strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action may petition the court for
permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale
consistent with its own views." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARv 43 (5th ed. 1983) (emphasis
added).
A comparison of these two definition shows that an amicus curiae is no longer by
definition an uninterested party interested in assisting the Judge. However, the Black's
Law Dictionary definition seems to indicate also that the amicus may not be on the side
of either party and may be representing other interested parties not otherwise party to
the suit.
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detailed rules on filing of amicus curiae briefs as part of an effort
to restrict the use of such submissions. The 1949 amendments
to the rule 4 9 distinguished between amicus curiae briefs filed
before the Court on the merits, i.e., after the writ for certiorari
had been granted, and those filed prior to grant of the writ of
certiorari. 5 ° The Supreme Court discouraged the, filing of ami-
cus curiae briefs without consent of the parties, particularly if
filed before the writ of certiorari had been granted. 51 In addi-
tion, the new amendments emphasized the need for the consent
of all. parties, 152 a requirement that had been frequently disre-
garded in the past.'53 The 1949 Amendments also required par-
ties wishing to participate as amicus curiae and who were denied
permission by either party to file a "motion for leave" with the
Supreme Court.154 In such motions the applicant had to justify
the need for the amicus curiae brief. Specifically, these motions
for leave were required to ,state why the questions of law or fact
addressed in the amici have not been adequately presented by
149. Sup. CT. R. 27(9), 338 U.S. 959 (1949) [hereinafter 19.49 Amendment].
150. See id.
151. See id. 27(9)(b) states in part:
Brief of an amicus curiae prior to consideration ofjurisdictional statement or petition for
writ ofcertiorari:-A brief of an amicus curiae filed with consent of the parties,
or motion, independent of the brief, for leave to file when consent is refused.
may be filed only if submitted a reasonable time prior to the consideration of a
jurisdictional statement or a petition for writ of certiorari. Such motions are
not favored.
Id.
152. Rule 27(9) of the 1949 Amendment provides that:
Brief of an amicus curiae in cases before the Court on the merts:-A brief of an ami-
cus curiae may be filed only after order of the Court or when accompanied by
written consent of all parties to the case and presented promptly after an-
nouncement postponing or noting probable jurisdiction... [or] granting cer-
tiorari....
Id.
153. See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of
Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JusTicE SYSTEM J. 35, 37-38 (1983).
154. 1949 Amendment, supra note 149. Sup. Ct. Rule 27 (c) provides:
Motion for Leave to File: When consent to a filing of the brief of an amicus
curiae is refused by a party to the case, a motion independent of the brief, for
leave to file may timely be presented to the Court. It shall concisely state the
nature of the applicant's interest, set forth facts or questions of law that have
not been, or reasons for believing that they will not adequately be, presented
by the parties, and their relevancy to the disposition of the case. A party
served with such motion may seasonably file in this Court an objection con-
cisely stating the reasons for withholding consent.
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any party and the relevancy of such additional information to
the outcome of the case.155
As a result of the 1949 Amendment, amicus curiae participa-
tion decreased from 31.6% of the ninety-eight cases in 1949 to
13.6% of the ninety-five cases in 1951.156 Others have estimated
that during this time period the Court rejected 76% of the mo-
tions for leave to file amicus curiae briefs.1 57 It is reported that
at approximately the same time the 1949 Amendments were im-
plemented, the Supreme Court sent "a signal" to the Solicitor
General of the United States that the government should refrain
from giving consent in cases where the United States was a
party.158 In fact, until 1957 the U.S. government would refuse to
consent to filings of amicus curiae briefs in cases in which it was
a party. 15
9
It has been argued that the 1949 Amendments were made
because some Supreme Court Justices were "put off' by the
"propagandistic" tone of certain amicus curiae filings in high
profile cases such as those involving the Hollywood Ten 6 ' and
the espionage cases against the Rosenbergs.'6 1 In both cases, the
filings were made at the certiorari level, i.e., before the Supreme
Court decided to look at the merits of the case. 6 2 It is important
to note that the Court's response to excessively partisan or
propagandistic amicus curiae briefs was to require prior filing of
motions for leave and which were then consistently rejected. In
other words, the response of the Supreme Court to a substantive
problem was to issue procedures and then apply them in a re-
strictive manner throughout the 1950s.
Additional amendments were made to the Supreme Court
Rules on amicus curiae in 1954.6' The 1954 Amendments clari-
155. See id.
156. See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 153, at 37.
157. See id. at 38.
158. See Krislov, supra note 129, at 715.
159. See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 153, at 38.
160. See Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934
(1950).
161. United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F.Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 200 F.2d 666
(2d. Cir. 1952) cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
162. See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 153, at 37.
163. See Rules of the Supreme Court, THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, Vol. 1, Pt.1,
Order 104, Rule 42 (1954) [hereinafter RSC].
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fled issues such as the form for filing motions and briefs,1 6 4 the
time table for filing of amicus curiae briefs,' 65 and set page limits
for motions for leave.
1 66
In the late 1950s, there was a change in attitude towards
amicus curiae briefs. Justices Black and Frankfurter in particular
were critical of the Solicitor General practice of denying con-
sent. As early as 1952 Justice Frankfurter had written that:
If all litigants were to take the position of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, either no amicus curiae briefs ... would be allowed, or a
fair sifting process for dealing with such applications would
be nullified and undue burden cast upon the Court. Neither
alternate is conducive to the wise disposition of the Court's
business. 167
Similarly, two years later Justice Black also wrote:
I have never found the almost insuperable obstacle of rules
put in the way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other
than litigants. Most of the cases before the Court involve mat-
ters that affect far more than the immediate record parties. I
think public interest and judicial administration would be
better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule
against amicus curiae briefs. 168
In response to criticism, the Solicitor General changed its
policy and began to give consent to amicus curiae filings in cases
involving the government. 169 This marked the beginning of the
"laissez faire" attitude of the court towards amicus curiae
briefs 7° that continues today.' 7 ' For example, in the case of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a total of seventy-five amicus
curiae briefs were filed. 1 72 It is estimated that over the last fifty
years the incidence of amicus curiae participation has increased
164. See id. Rule 42(3) (clarifying that the motion for leave did not need to be
separate from the brief itself).
165. See id. Rule 42(2) (amending to provide that an amicus curiae brief must be
filed at the same time as the party whose position is being supported by the amicus
curiae brief).
166. See id. Rule 42(2) (providing a five printed page limit for a motion for leave).
167. Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952) (emphasis added).
168. See RSC at 947.
169. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 764.
170. Id.
171. Id. (stating that it is Supreme Court practice to "allow essentially unlimited
amicus participation").
172. See id.
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by more than 800%.173
In 1990, the Supreme Court amended its rules ("1990
Amendment") in response to the dramatic increase in the num-
ber of amicus curiae filings. 74 The 1990 Amendment discour-
aged filing of repetitious or irrelevant amicus briefs and pro-
vided that "[a] n amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention
of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention
by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An ami-
cus brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and
its filing is not favored." '175 The 1990 Amendment is a substantive
amendment to the extent that it addresses the substance of an
amicus curiae submission rather than the filing procedure. The
impact of the 1990 Amendment in improving the quality of ami-
cus curiae briefs filed with the Supreme Court has not been as-
sessed. Studies, however, have shown that poorly reasoned and
excessively partisan briefs written by inexperienced lawyers are
significantly less effective than well reasoned filings by exper-
ienced lawyers."' Therefore, in many ways, the 1990 Amend-
ment is an acknowledgment on the part of the Supreme Court
of the drawbacks of an "open door policy" towards amicus curiae
submissions, and the burden such a policy imposes on the Su-
preme Court. vv
The most significant amendment to the Supreme Court
rules was made in 1997 ("1997 Amendment") when a new sub-
section was added. Subsection 6 states:
173. See id. at 749.
174. The Supreme Court Rules on amicus curiae briefs were also amended prior
to this in 1980 in only two respects. First, instead of requiring the amicus to be filed "a
reasonable time" prior to the consideration of the petition by the Court, which was very
indefinite and unhelpful, it fixes the time as the same as for the brief in opposition to
the petition, thirty days after the petition is received. Second, it provides that an amicus
curiae brief cannot exceed twenty pages in length. See RSC, supra note 163, at Order
104, rule 36 (1989).
175. Sup. CT. R. 37(1) (emphasis added).
176. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 813-14.
177. Justice Posner has expressed clear opposition to an open door policy towards
amicus curiae briefs. See Ryan v. Commodity Future's Trading Commission, 125 F.3d. 1062
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that vast majority of amicus filings should not be allowed as they
are unhelpful and filed by allies of litigants and "abuse" the institution of amicus curiae
which means "friend of the court, not friend of the party"); see also National Organization
for Women, Inc., v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. Ill. 2000) (stating that the "policy
of this court is ... never to grant permission to file an amicus curiae brief that essen-
tially merely duplicates the brief of one of the parties").
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A brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel
for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and shall
identify every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae,
its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary contribu-
tion to the preparation or submission of the brief. The dis-
closure shall be made in the first footnote on the first page of
text. 178
By adopting the 1997 Amendment the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that an amicus curiae is no longer a "friend of the
court" or a disinterested bystander. 179 In fact, in Jafee v. Red-
mond'8 0 Justice Scalia lamented the partisan reality of amicus cu-
riae filings and their potentially distortive effect on the outcome
of a case when he wrote:
[A] micus briefs supporting respondents, most of which came
from such organizations as the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American
Association of State Social Work Boards ..... Not a single
amicus brief was filed in support of the petitioner. That is no
surprise. There is no self-interested organization out there de-
voted to pursuit of truth in the federal courts.' 8 '
Through the 1997 Amendment the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the reality of judicial lobbying through amicus curiae
submissions. The response has been to require full disclosure by
an amicus curiae of its affiliations so that the lobbying may take
place in an open and transparent manner. A transparent proce-
dure presumably limits the negative effects of amicus curiae fil-
ings. In the United States, full disclosure and transparency
makes judicial lobbying acceptable. Once affiliations and biases
are registered on the first page of an amicus brief the position of
the brief can be inferred without much attention being given to
the contents of such briefs. Today, the usefulness of the rule
178. SuP. CT. R. 37(6) (1997). The exception to this requirement is the Solicitor
General of the United States.
179. The only exception to this is the Office of the Solicitor General, which has
developed a special relationship with the Supreme Court and is expected to have as
part of its duty to protect the high court in discharging its functions and sometimes
reviewing the Court's docket to relieve the Court from unmeritorious claims. See, e.g.,
Janene M. Marasciullo, Removability and the Rule of Law: The Independence of the Solicitor
General, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 750 (1989).
180. 518 U.S. 1923 (1996) (holding that federal law recognizes psychotherapist-
patient privilege).
181. Id. at 1940
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may be shown by the fact that most amicus briefs filed with the
Supreme Court, with the notable exception of those filed by the
Solicitor General have little impact on the decisions of the Su-
preme Court.
C. Lessons Learned from the American Amicus Curiae Experience
The U.S. experience with amicus curiae teaches us a num-
ber of things. First, use of an amicus curiae is embedded in the
common law tradition. At common law it was acceptable for a
Judge to not know all the cases that may be relevant law in a
particular case or controversy and for an amici to appear to assist
the Judge in clarifying issues of law. From the perspective of a
common law lawyer, therefore, the argument that amicus curiae
briefs should be limited to issues of fact and not law fails to rec-
ognize the essence of an amicus curiae.
18 2
Second, the evolution of an amicus curiae from "friend of
the court" to "lobbyist" has been. explicitly acknowledged by the
Supreme Court of the United States for the past fifty years. The
Supreme Court has dealt with this evolution and its inherent
drawbacks by issuing detailed procedures for submissions of
such briefs. These procedures were applied restrictively,
throughout the 1950s, thereby allowing the Supreme Court to
reject the vast majority of the motions for leave to file an amicus.
From late 1950s to the present, these same procedures have
been applied liberally as the U.S. Supreme Court adopted an
open door policy towards amicus curiae submissions. The practi-
cal result of an open door policy has been that many amicus
curiae submissions are ignored and have little impact on the Su-
preme Court's decision making. Finally, in 1997, the Supreme
Court by issuing the 1997 amendments explicitly acknowledged
that amicus curiae briefs are a form of 'judicial lobbying," and
announced its decision to tackle the problem by insisting that
such lobbying take place in an open and transparent manner.
IV. JUDICIAL LOBBYING ON THE GLOBAL STAGE
In the American context, judicial lobbying is accepted so
182. But see Raghavan, supra note 13 (citing statement made by Indian official that
"[i] t is ironic that the Appellate Body which comprises persons of recognized authority,
with demonstrated expertise in law should look for outside guidance in the form of
amicus briefs").
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long as it is acknowledged as such. This comfort level with the
concept of amicus curiae briefs as 'judicial lobbying" helps ex-
plain why the United States has been supportive of the use of
such briefs at the WTO. The Additional Procedures issued by
the Appellate Body in the E.C.-Asbestos case are very close if not
identical to the Supreme Court rules on amicus curiae briefs. In
E.C.--Asbestos the Appellate Body was trying to do the same
thing the U.S. Supreme Court has done. Like the Supreme
Court rules, the Additional Procedures require groups to iden-
tify their membership, affiliation, and funding.'83 The Addi-
tional Procedures also require disclosure of information as to
who was funding the very activity of filing an amicus curiae.' 84
Much like the U.S. Supreme Court did in 1949, the Appellate
Body in E.C.--Asbestos issued neutral procedures that seem to
invite participation. Like the U.S. Supreme Court did in. the
1950s, the Appellate Body applied those procedures in an un-
necessarily restrictive manner and rejected all applicants. The
WTO members may be justified in their concern, however, since,
as the U.S. experience has shown, the same procedural rules can
in the future be used by the Appellate Body to pursue an "open
door" policy towards amicus curiae briefs.
It is likely that all the Appellate Body hoped to do was, as
the United States has argued, "manage" the lobbying that was
already taking place. The Appellate Body failed to realize, how-
ever, that its procedural solution to the amicus curiae "problem"
may be unacceptable. The WTO Appellate Body has neither the
legal tradition nor the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court
and, therefore, cannot use the procedural tactics of the Court.
POSTSCRIPT
On March 12, 2001 the Appellate Body issued its ruling in
EC-Asbestos. The Body provided no additional explanation as to
why it had denied applications for leave to file amicus curiae
briefs. The Appellate Body merely stated that the applicants had
failed to "comply sufficiently with all the requirements set forth
in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure."185
183. Additional Procedures para. 3(c).
184. Id.; see also id. para. 3(g).
185. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Prod-
ucts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
